CONTAGION AND THE SPEED OF ADJUSTMENT IN SMALL WORLDS

Edward Cartwright

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2007, vol. 09, issue 04, 689-704

Abstract: We model a simple dynamic process in which myopic agents are matched amongst each other to play a coordination game. The network of player interaction is varied between a regular lattice and a random network allowing us to model contagion in small world networks. Weighting times for an equilibrium shift from the risk dominated to risk dominant equilibrium are shown to be smallest in small world networks.

Keywords: Best reply; contagion; small worlds; JEL Classification: C62; JEL Classification: C72; JEL Classification: C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198907001667

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