EVOLUTION AND THE COMPLEXITY OF FINITE AUTOMATA
Moez Kilani
International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2007, vol. 09, issue 04, 731-743
Abstract:
Prisoner's dilemma played by finite automata is reviewed again using a slightly modified measure of complexity. At a first step, an equilibrium with a large number of possible outcomes is shown to hold. At a second stage, we consider a game of repeated interaction, and show that on (limit) equilibrium only cooperative actions are played. We conclude that cooperation is the result of a (complex) long interaction.
Keywords: Finite automata; complexity of the strategy; cooperation; evolution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:04:n:s0219198907001692
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198907001692
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