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FRIENDLINESS AND RECIPROCITY IN EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION

Giuseppe De Marco and Jacqueline Morgan ()

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2008, vol. 10, issue 01, 53-72

Abstract: A concept of altruistic behavior (calledfriendly behavior) has been defined and used for equilibrium selection in some bargaining models in Rusinowska (2002), "Refinements of Nash Equilibria in view of Jealous and Friendly Behavior of Players",International Game Theory Review, 4, 281–299.In this paper, the situation in which every player has friendly behavior is incorporated into the general context of normal form games by introducing a new refinement concept (calledfriendliness equilibrium). Existence, properties and connections with another refinement concept, introduced by the authors in a previous paper and which captures an idea of reciprocal altruism, are investigated. Examples and counterexamples are given illustrating concepts, results and links with other classical refinement concepts.

Keywords: Nash equilibrium refinement; friendliness equilibrium; altruistic behavior; pseudo-game; efficiency; 91A06; 91A10; 91A26; C720 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198908001777

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