MULTISTAGE COMMUNICATION WITH AND WITHOUT VERIFIABLE TYPES

Frederic Koessler and Francoise Forges

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2008, vol. 10, issue 02, 145-164

Abstract: We survey selected results on strategic information transmission. We distinguish between "cheap talk" and "persuasion". In the latter model, the informed player's message set depends on his type. As a benchmark, we first assume that the informed player sends a single message to the decision maker. We state characterization results for the sets of equilibrium payoffs, with and without verifiable types. We then show that multistage, bilateral communication enables the players to achieve new equilibrium outcomes, even if types are verifiable. We also propose complete characterizations of the equilibrium payoffs that are achievable with a bounded number of communication rounds.

Keywords: Cheap talk; certification; incomplete information; information transmission; jointly controlled lotteries; verifiable types; C72; D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Multistage communication with and without verifiable types (2008)
Working Paper: Multistage communication with and without verifiable types (2008)
Working Paper: Multistage communication with and without verifiable types (2006)
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198908001844

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