THE PROPORTIONAL LOTTERY PROTOCOL IS STRONGLY β-PARTICIPATORY AND VNM-STRATEGY-PROOF

Stefano Vannucci ()
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Stefano Vannucci: University of Siena, Department of Economics, Italy

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2008, vol. 10, issue 02, 195-203

Abstract: A voting protocol is said to bestrongly β-participatoryif for any voteriand any strategy profile either the outcome isi′s preferred one orihas a sincere strategy which would ensure her a better outcome, andVNM-strategy-proofif at any preference profile the set of sincere strategies of each voter is a VNM-stable set. It is shown that the proportional lottery (PL) modular voting protocol is both strongly β-participatory and VNM-strategy-proof.

Keywords: D70; D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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DOI: 10.1142/S021919890800187X

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