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FISHERY MANAGEMENT GAMES: HOW TO ADMIT NEW MEMBERS AND REDUCE HARVESTING LEVELS

Kim Hang Pham Do, Henk Folmer () and Henk Norde ()
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Henk Norde: Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, and Center, Tilburg University, P. O. Box 90513, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2008, vol. 10, issue 03, 319-333

Abstract: This paper applies game theory to address the problem of allocating profits among fishing nations, once the countries concerned have expressed an interest in achieving an agreement through a Regional Fishery Management Organization (RFMO). Proposing the population monotonic allocation scheme as management rule for division of profits, we argue that existing RFMOs can be expanded by means of the Shapley value. We also show that adjustment from the Nash equilibrium to sustainable or more efficient can be achieved by means of the proportional rule without harming any of the countries involved.

Keywords: Transboundary fishery management; proportional rule; population monotonic allocation scheme; Shapley value; Subject Classification: 91A40; Subject Classification: 91A80; Subject Classification: 91B74; Subject Classification: 91B76 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198908001960

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