ENDOGENOUS FORMATION OF COALITIONS
Guillermo Owen ()
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Guillermo Owen: Department of Applied Mathematics, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 93943, USA
International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2008, vol. 10, issue 04, 461-470
Abstract:
We develop a model of coalition formation based on personal proximities among the players of ann-person game. Several examples are worked out in detail, showing that certain coalitions are much more stable than others, and/or much more likely to form than others. We also consider the dynamics of such coalition-formation. By a numerical example, we show that small changes in the initial conditions can lead to very different results in the coalitions formed in a given game.
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:10:y:2008:i:04:n:s0219198908002047
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198908002047
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