ASSIGNMENT SITUATIONS WITH MULTIPLE OWNERSHIP AND THEIR GAMES

Silvia Miquel, Bas van Velzen, Herbert Hamers () and Henk Norde
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Silvia Miquel: Departament de Matematica, Universitat de Lleida, Spain
Bas van Velzen: Tilburg University, Department of Econometrics and OR, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Herbert Hamers: Tilburg University, Department of Econometrics and OR, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Henk Norde: Tilburg University, Department of Econometrics and OR, Tilburg, The Netherlands

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2009, vol. 11, issue 01, 1-13

Abstract: An assignment situation can be considered as a two-sided market consisting of two disjoint sets of objects. A non-negative reward matrix describes the profit if an object of one group is assigned to an object of the other group. Assuming that each object is owned by a different agent, Shapley and Shubik (1972) introduced a class of assignment games.This paper introduces assignment situations with multiple ownership (AMO). In these situations an object can be owned by several agents and an agent can participate in the ownership of more than one object. For AMO situations we introduce the class ofk-AMO games. An AMO situation is called balanced if for any choice of the reward matrix the corresponding 1-AMO game is balanced. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for balancedness of AMO situations. Moreover, sufficient conditions are provided for balancedness ofk-AMO games.

Keywords: Assignment situations; matchings; assignment games; balancedness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1142/S021919890900211X

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