THE GAINS FROM COOPERATIVE R&D WITH A CONCAVE TECHNOLOGY AND SPILLOVERS

Luca Lambertini () and Gianpaolo Rossini ()
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Gianpaolo Rossini: Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Strada Maggiore 45, 40125 Bologna, Italy

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2009, vol. 11, issue 01, 77-85

Abstract: We reassess the respective gains from R&D cooperation and competition in a Cournot duopoly where firms adopt a concave cost-reducing R&D technology. Cooperation, in the form of either a cartel or a joint venture, is always profitable for firms and, contrary to the previous literature on the same topic, (i) no corner solutions emerge and (ii) R&D cooperation is socially superior to independent ventures for any spillover level, provided the cost of R&D financing is sufficiently high.

Keywords: Process innovation; R&D cooperation; joint ventures; L13; O31; O38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Working Paper: The gains from cooperative R&D with a concave technology and spillovers (2004)
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198909002157

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