PARTITIONING GAMES WITH RESTRICTED COOPERATION

Iris Auriol () and Ezio Marchi ()
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Iris Auriol: Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis, Conicet — Universidad Nacional de San Luis, Ejército de los Andes 950, CP 5700, San Luis, Argentina
Ezio Marchi: Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis, Conicet — Universidad Nacional de San Luis, Ejército de los Andes 950, CP 5700, San Luis, Argentina

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2009, vol. 11, issue 01, 99-109

Abstract: Partitioning games and games with restricted cooperation are general games which include large classes of different and important cooperative games. In this paper we combined both concepts and prove a generalization of the theorem of Quint [1991] which characterizes the core of the game by means of an appropriate linear program.

Keywords: Partitioning games; assignment games; cooperative games; C70; C71; 90A05; 90A07 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198909002169

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