ANn-PERSON RUBINSTEIN BARGAINING GAME
Pär Torstensson ()
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Pär Torstensson: SVERIGES RIKSBANK, Policy and Analysis Division, Financial Stability Department, SE-103 37, Stockholm, Sweden
International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2009, vol. 11, issue 01, 111-115
Abstract:
When Herrero (1985) extends Rubinstein's (1982) alternating-offers bargaining model to the case of three or more players any agreement can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) outcome, given a sufficiently large discount factor. We show that this is not the case when players demand shares for themselves instead of proposing agreements to each other. Although it is possible to rule out agreements, the majority remains to be SPE outcomes.
Keywords: Multilateral bargaining; n-person bargaining; subgame perfect equilibria; C78; C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:11:y:2009:i:01:n:s0219198909002170
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198909002170
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