THE CORE COINCIDES WITH THE NUCLEOLUS ALLOCATIONS IN A PUBLIC GOODS ECONOMY WITH TAXATION

Toshiyuki Hirai ()
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Toshiyuki Hirai: Graduate School of Decision Science and Technology, Tokyo Institute of Technology, 2-12-1 Ookayama, Meguro-ku, Tokyo 152-8550, Japan

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2009, vol. 11, issue 02, 141-155

Abstract: We study a public goods economy with a certain tax system to finance public goods provision. Each coalition is allowed to tax the complementary coalition when proposing a new allocation. Taxation is regulated by a public authority so as to satisfy certain restriction on the resulting allocation. We show that the core coincides with the set of nucleolus allocations defined in this economy. We also show that the core is nonempty under the usual convexity assumptions.

Keywords: Nucleolus allocations; effective excess; T-core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198909002224

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