A NOTE ON THE MONOTONIC CORE

Jesús Getán (), Jesús Montes () and Carles Rafels ()
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Jesús Getán: Department of Actuarial, Financial and Economic Mathematics, University of Barcelona, Avd. Diagonal, 690; E-08034 Barcelona, Spain
Jesús Montes: Department of Economics and Social Sciences, University Abat Oliba CEU, Bellesguard, 30; E-08022 Barcelona, Spain
Carles Rafels: Department of Actuarial, Financial and Economic Mathematics, University of Barcelona, Avd. Diagonal, 690; E-08034 Barcelona, Spain

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2009, vol. 11, issue 02, 229-235

Abstract: The monotonic core of a cooperative game with transferable utility is the set formed by all its Population Monotonic Allocation Schemes. In this paper we show that this set always coincides with the core of a certain game, with and without restricted cooperation, associated to the initial game.

Keywords: Population Monotonic Allocation Schemes; monotonic core; games with restricted cooperation; 91A12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198909002285

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