A VALUE FOR CEPHOIDAL NTU-GAMES

Joachim Rosenmüller ()
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Joachim Rosenmüller: Institute of Mathematical Economics, University of Bielefeld, D–33615 Bielefeld, Germany

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2009, vol. 11, issue 03, 247-272

Abstract: A Cephoid is an algebraic ("Minkowski") sum of finitely many prisms inℝn. A cephoidal game is an NTU game the feasible sets of which are cephoids. We provide a version of the Shapley NTU value for such games based on the bargaining solution of Maschler–Perles. The value is characterized by a suitable set of axioms

Keywords: NTU-Games; bargaining; solutions; values; 91A12; 91A06 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198909002303

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