A LOCATION GAME ON DISJOINT CIRCLES

Marcin Dziubiński (), Debabrata Datta () and Jaideep Roy
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Marcin Dziubiński: Institute of Informatics, Warsaw University, Banacha 2, 02-097 Warsaw, Poland
Debabrata Datta: Institute of Management Technology, Raj Nagar, Post Box No. 137, Ghaziabad 201001, India

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2009, vol. 11, issue 04, 391-406

Abstract: Two players are endowed with resources for setting upNlocations onKidentical circles, withN > K ≥ 1. The players alternately choose these locations (possibly in batches of more than one in each round) in order to secure the area closer to their locations than that of their rival's. They face a resource mobility constraint such that not allNlocations can be placed in the first round. The player with the highest secured area wins the game and otherwise the game ends in a tie. Earlier research has shown that forK = 1, the second mover always has a winning strategy in this game. In this paper we show that withK > 1, the second mover advantage disappears as in this case both players have a tying strategy. We also study a natural variant of this game where the resource mobility constraint is more stringent so that in each round each player chooses a single location where we show that the second mover advantage re-appears. We suggest some Nash equilibrium configurations of locations in both versions of the game.

Keywords: Competitive locations; disjoint spaces; Winning/Tying strategies; equilibrium configurations; C72; D21; D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Related works:
Working Paper: A Location Game On Disjoint Circles (2007)
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DOI: 10.1142/S021919890900239X

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