THE SHAPLEY VALUE, THE OWEN VALUE, AND THE VEIL OF IGNORANCE

André Casajus ()
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André Casajus: HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management, Jahnallee 59, D-04109 Leipzig, Germany;

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2009, vol. 11, issue 04, 453-457

Abstract: We show that the Owen value for TU games with a cooperation structure extends the Shapley value in a consistent way. In particular, the Shapley value is the expected Owen value for all symmetric distributions on the partitions of the player set. Similar extensions of the Banzhaf value do not show this property.

Keywords: Shapley value; Owen value; Banzhaf value; extension; consistency; C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198909002431

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