ON COOPERATIVE GAMES RELATED TO MARKET SITUATIONS AND AUCTIONS

Rodica Branzei (), Vito Fragnelli (), Ana Meca () and Stef Tijs ()
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Rodica Branzei: "Alexander Ioan Cuza" University, Faculty of Computer Science, 11, Carol I Bd., 700483 Iaşi, Romania
Ana Meca: University Miguel Hernandez of Elche, Operations Research Center and Department of Statistics, Mathematics and Computer Sciences, Edificio Torretamarit, Avda. de la Universidad s/n 03202 Elche (Alicante), Spain
Stef Tijs: CentER and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2009, vol. 11, issue 04, 459-470

Abstract: We consider a market situation with two corners. One corner consists of a single seller with one object, and the other corner consists of potential buyers who all want the object. We suppose that the valuations of the object for the different buyers are known by all of them. Then two types of cooperative games, which we call market games and ring games, corresponding to such market situations are considered.Market games are related to special total big boss games, while ring games are related to special convex games, the peer group games. It turns out that there exists a duality relation between the market game and the ring game arising from the same two-corner market situation. For both classes of games relevant solution concepts are studied.

Keywords: Market games; ring games; one-object auction situations; big boss games; peer group games; 91A12; 90B05; C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198909002443

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