SKEW-SYMMETRY UNDER SIMULTANEOUS REVISIONS

Thomas Norman

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2009, vol. 11, issue 04, 471-478

Abstract: Invariant selection of the risk-dominant equilibrium of evolutionary coordination games with "skew-symmetric" noise processes is extended to the case of simultaneous strategy revisions.

Keywords: Evolution; noise; skew-symmetry; simultaneous revisions; C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198909002455

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