A NOTE ON DISCRETE BID FIRST-PRICE AUCTION WITH GENERAL VALUE DISTRIBUTION

Gangshu (george) Cai (), Peter R. Wurman () and Xiting Gong ()
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Gangshu (george) Cai: Department of Management, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS 66506, USA
Peter R. Wurman: Kiva Systems, Inc., 225 Wildwood Avenue, Woburn, MA 01801, USA
Xiting Gong: Guanghua School of Management, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2010, vol. 12, issue 01, 75-81

Abstract: This paper evaluates the discrete bid first-price sealed-bid (FPSB) auction in a model with a general value distribution. We show that a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists for the discrete bid FPSB auction. We further prove that the discrete bid FPSB equilibrium conditionally converges to that of a continuous bid FPSB auction.

Keywords: First-price sealed-bid auction; discrete bid; Bayesian Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198910002520

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