COALITION-PROOF NASH EQUILIBRIA IN A NORMAL-FORM GAME AND ITS SUBGAMES

Ryusuke Shinohara ()
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Ryusuke Shinohara: Faculty of Economics, Shinshu University, 3-1-1, Asahi, Matsumoto, Nagano, 390-8621, Japan

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2010, vol. 12, issue 03, 253-261

Abstract: The relationship between coalition-proof (Nash) equilibria in a normal-form game and those in its subgame is examined. A subgame of a normal-form game is a game in which the strategy sets of all players in the subgame are subsets of those in the normal-form game. In this paper, focusing on a class of aggregative games, we provide a sufficient condition for the aggregative game under which every coalition-proof equilibrium in a subgame is also coalition-proof in the original normal-form game. The stringency of the sufficient condition means that a coalition-proof equilibrium in a subgame is rarely a coalition-proof equilibrium in the whole game.

Keywords: Coalition-proof equilibrium; aggregative games; no unilateral benefit; monotone externality; strategic substitutability; C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:12:y:2010:i:03:n:s0219198910002659

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198910002659

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