THE EXTENDED CORE OF A COOPERATIVE NTU GAME

Hans Keiding () and Yaroslavna Pankratova ()
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Hans Keiding: Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Øster Farimagsgade 5, DK-1353 Copenhagen K, Denmark
Yaroslavna Pankratova: Department of Mathematical Methods of Economic Research, International Banking Institute, Nevskii pr. 60, 191011 Saint-Petersburg, Russia

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2010, vol. 12, issue 03, 263-274

Abstract: In this paper we propose an extension of the core of NTU games from its domain to a larger set of games satisfying a few conditions of well-behavedness. The solution concept is a rather straightforward generalization of the extended core of TU games introduced by Gomez [2003] and is shown to have similar properties. Also, a set of axioms for solutions of NTU games is presented which characterizes the extended core.

Keywords: Cooperative games; NTU games; extensive core; axiomatization; 22E46; 53C35; 57S20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198910002660

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