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COALITIONAL SOLUTION OF A GAME-THEORETIC EMISSION REDUCTION MODEL

Nadezhda Kozlovskaya (), Leon Petrosyan () and Nikolay Zenkevich ()
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Nadezhda Kozlovskaya: St. Petersburg University, Volkhovski per. 1-3, St. Petersburg, 199004, Russia
Leon Petrosyan: St. Petersburg University, Universitetski pr. 35, St. Petersburg, 198504, Russia

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2010, vol. 12, issue 03, 275-286

Abstract: In this paper the problem of allocation over time of total cost incurred by coalitions of countries in a coalitional game of pollution reduction is considered. The Nash equilibrium in the game played by coalitions is computed and then the value of each coalition is allocated according to some given mechanism between its members.

Keywords: Differential games; dynamic programming; Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation; coalitional solution; Shapley value; 49N70; 91A12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198910002672

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