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A NOTE ON THE WEAK SEQUENTIAL CORE OF DYNAMIC TU GAMES

Helga Habis () and P. Jean-Jacques Herings ()

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2010, vol. 12, issue 04, 407-416

Abstract: This paper addresses a problem with an argument in Kranich, Perea, and Peters [2005] supporting their definition of the Weak Sequential Core and their characterization result. We also provide the remedy, a modification of the definition, to rescue the characterization.

Keywords: Cooperative games; dynamic games; core; C71; C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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DOI: 10.1142/S021919891000274X

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