NON-COOPERATIVE AND AXIOMATIC CHARACTERIZATIONS OF THE AVERAGE LEXICOGRAPHIC VALUE

Takumi Kongo (), Yukihiko Funaki (), Rodica Branzei and Stef Tijs
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Takumi Kongo: Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, 1-6-1 Nishi-Waseda, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 169-8050, Japan
Rodica Branzei: Faculty of Computer Science, "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University, Iasi, Romania
Stef Tijs: Center for Economic Research and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University, The Netherlands

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2010, vol. 12, issue 04, 417-435

Abstract: We give a non-cooperative and an axiomatic characterization of the Average Lexicographic value (AL-value) on the class of balanced games. The AL-value is a single-valued solution for balanced TU-games. It is defined as the average of lexicographic maximum of the core of the game with respect to all orders on the player set, and it can be seen as a core selection based on the priority orders on the players. In both of our characterizations of the AL-value, a consistency property which we call average consistency plays an important role, and the property is obtained by the consistency property à la Davis and Maschler of the lexicographic vectors with respect to any order of players.

Keywords: Cooperative games; average lexicographic value; average consistency; characterization; C71; C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198910002751

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