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ACTIVE VS. PASSIVE DEFENSE AGAINST A STRATEGIC ATTACKER

Kjell Hausken and Gregory Levitin ()
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Gregory Levitin: Collaborative Autonomic Computing Laboratory, School of Computer Science, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, China;

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2011, vol. 13, issue 01, 1-12

Abstract: The article analyzes how a defender determines a balance between protecting an object (passive defense) and striking preventively against an attacker seeking to destroy the object (active defense). The attacker analogously determines a balance between attacking and protecting against the preventive strike. The defender makes its decision about striking preventively based on its estimate of the probability of being attacked. In both cases of preventive strike and no preventive strike, the defender anticipates the most harmful attacker's strategy. The influence of the ratio between the player's resources and the contest intensities on the solution of the game is analyzed.

Keywords: Survivability; active defense; passive defense; attack; protection; contest intensity; JEL Classification Number: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198911002812

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