A NOTE ON CHARACTERIZING CORE STABILITY WITH FUZZY GAMES

Evan Shellshear ()
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Evan Shellshear: FCC, Chalmers Science Park, Göteborg, SE-412 88, Sweden

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2011, vol. 13, issue 01, 105-118

Abstract: This paper investigates core stability of cooperative (TU) games via a fuzzy extension of the totally balanced cover of a cooperative game. The stability of the core of the fuzzy extension of a game, the concave extension, is shown to reflect the core stability of the original game and vice versa. Stability of the core is then shown to be equivalent to the existence of an equilibrium of a certain correspondence.

Keywords: Cooperative game; core; stable set; fuzzy coalition; fuzzy game; core stability; JEL Classification: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198911002885

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