STABLE SOLUTIONS ON MATCHING MODELS WITH QUOTA RESTRICTION

Delfina Femenia (), Mabel Marí (), Alejandro Neme () and Jorge Oviedo
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Delfina Femenia: Universidad Nacional de San Juan, San Juan, Argentina
Mabel Marí: Universidad Nacional de San Juan, San Juan, Argentina

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2011, vol. 13, issue 02, 159-179

Abstract: In this paper, we present a matching market in which an institution has to hire a set of pairs of complementary workers, and has a quota that is the maximum number of candidates pair positions to be filled. We define a stable solution and first show that in the unrestricted institution preferences domain, the set of stable solution may be empty and second we obtain a complete characterization of the stable sets under responsive restriction of the institution's preference.

Keywords: Matching; quota restriction; q-stable (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198911002927

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