NONCOOPERATIVE GAMES FROM TU GAMES WITH INFORMATION COST
Federica Briata ()
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Federica Briata: University of Trento, via Belenzani, 12-38122 Trento, Italy
International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2011, vol. 13, issue 03, 301-323
Abstract:
From a special class of TU games with information cost, given by the problem of sharing the costs of facilities among users, we build a noncooperative game in which every player asks for the assessment of whom the users are. We analyze two models, "naming" game and majority decision game: the existence of equilibria is assured since the games are binary and symmetric, and then potential games. Since the games are ex-ante fair, we search a proposal to compensate for ex-post injustice.
Keywords: TU game; potential game; binary choice game; symmetric game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:13:y:2011:i:03:n:s0219198911003015
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198911003015
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