A COMPLEMENTARY NOTE ON THE ISSUE OF TIME INCONSISTENCY REVISITED AS AN EXTENDED GAME
Hubert Kempf () and
Grégoire Rota Graziosi
International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2011, vol. 13, issue 04, 475-480
Abstract:
Cellini and Lambertini endogenize through a timing game the moves of the central bank and the private sector in a model of monetary policy la Barro and Gordon. They find a multiplicity of equilibria, as the two Stackelberg outcomes emerge as the solutions of the timing game, with different inflation levels. By using the risk-dominance criterion to select the equilibrium we prove that there is a discontinuity in the inflation bias, depending on the inflation aversion of the private sector.
Keywords: Endogenous timing; first-second-mover advantage; monetary policy; time consistency; risk dominance; E52; E61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Working Paper: A complementary note on the issue of time inconsistency revisited as an extended game (2011)
Working Paper: A complementary note on the issue of time inconsistency revisited as an extended game (2011)
Working Paper: A complementary note on the issue of time inconsistency revisited as an extended game (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:13:y:2011:i:04:n:s0219198911003106
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198911003106
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