TRANSBOUNDARY WATER MANAGEMENT: CAN ISSUE LINKAGE HELP MITIGATE EXTERNALITIES?

Kim Hang Pham Do, Ariel Dinar and Daene McKinney
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Ariel Dinar: Water Sciences and Policy Center, Department of Environmental Sciences, University of California, Riverside, USA
Daene McKinney: Center for Research in Water Resources, Department of Civil, Architectural and Environmental Engineering, University of Texas at Austin, USA

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2012, vol. 14, issue 01, 1-20

Abstract: Managing transboundary river basins is never easy and usually involves conflicts. This paper introduces a special class of games with externalities and issue linkage to promote cooperation on transboundary water resources. The paper analyzes whether issue linkages can be used as a form of negotiations on sharing benefits and mitigating conflicts. It is shown that whenever opportunities for linkages exist, countries may indeed contribute towards cooperation. In particular, if the linked games are convex, the grand coalition is the only optimal level of social welfare.

Keywords: Games with externalities; convexity; s-core; transboundary rivers; issue linkage; international water sharing agreement; C71; C72; D62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198912500028

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