RANKING AUCTIONS: A COOPERATIVE APPROACH

Juan Aparicio, Natividad Llorca (), Joaquin Sanchez-Soriano (), Manuel A. Pulido () and Julia Sancho
Additional contact information
Natividad Llorca: Operations Research Center (CIO), University Miguel Hernandez of Elche, Avda de la Universidad s/n, Elche, 03202, Spain
Joaquin Sanchez-Soriano: Operations Research Center (CIO), University Miguel Hernandez of Elche, Avda de la Universidad s/n, Elche, 03202, Spain
Manuel A. Pulido: Depto. Estadística e Investigación Operativa, Universidad de Murcia, Campus de Espinardo, Facultad de Matemáticas, Murcia, 30071, Spain
Julia Sancho: Consejería de Educación, Formación y Empleo., Comunidad Autónoma Región de Murcia, Avda. de la Fama 15, Murcia, 30071, Spain

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2012, vol. 14, issue 01, 1-19

Abstract: In this paper, we deal with situations arising from markets where an Internet search service provider offers a service of listing firms in decreasing order according to what they have bid. We call these ranking auction situations and introduce the corresponding TU-games. The core, as well as the two friendly solutions for the corners of the market, in this class of games can be easily described using a related assignment game. We study the Alexia value and the Shapley value of this type of games. Using these solutions, we show which circumstances in the game are in favor of the provider and which are beneficial to the bidders.

Keywords: Cooperative games; ranking auctions; core; Alexia value; Shapley value; 91A12; 91B26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S021919891250003X
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:14:y:2012:i:01:n:s021919891250003x

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

DOI: 10.1142/S021919891250003X

Access Statistics for this article

International Game Theory Review (IGTR) is currently edited by David W K Yeung

More articles in International Game Theory Review (IGTR) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().