A NOTE ON PASSEPARTOUT PROBLEMS

Arantza Estévez-Fernández (), Peter Borm and Herbert Hamers ()
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Arantza Estévez-Fernández: Tinbergen Institute and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, VU University Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Herbert Hamers: CentER and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University, Warandelaan 2, 5037 AB Tilburg, The Netherlands
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Arantza Estévez Fernández

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2012, vol. 14, issue 02, 1-9

Abstract: This note provides a methodological contribution to the allocation of joint revenues obtained from passepartouts. In a passepartout system, a group of service providers offers a passepartout that allows its owners the use of specified services for an unlimited number of times during a fixed period of time. The corresponding allocation problem is, then, how to share the total joint revenues of the passepartout system adequately among the service providers. Arguments are provided to model a passepartout problem within the framework of bankruptcy and context-specific properties are considered in order to select an appropriate allocation rule.

Keywords: Passepartout problem; bankruptcy problem; allocation rule; D02; C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: A Note on Passepartout Problems (2010)
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198912500132

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