COMPLETE SOLUTION OF A PURSUIT–EVASION DIFFERENTIAL GAME WITH HYBRID EVADER DYNAMICS

Josef Shinar (), Valery Y. Glizer () and Vladimir Turetsky ()
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Josef Shinar: Faculty of Aerospace Engineering, Technion – Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa 32000, Israel
Valery Y. Glizer: Department of Mathematics, Ort Braude College, P. O. Box 78, Karmiel 21982, Israel
Vladimir Turetsky: Department of Mathematics, Ort Braude College, P. O. Box 78, Karmiel 21982, Israel

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2012, vol. 14, issue 03, 1-31

Abstract: A pursuit–evasion differential game of prescribed duration with bounded controls is considered. The evader has two possible dynamics, while the pursuer dynamics is fixed. The evader can change its dynamics once during the game and its initial lateral acceleration is nonzero. The pursuer knows the possible dynamics of the evader, but not the actual one. Due to the different information sets of the players the game is not zero-sum. The robust capture zone of the pursuer and the robust escape zone of the evader are constructed and analyzed. Since the game is not zero-sum the robust capture/escape zones do not complement each other. Illustrative examples are presented.

Keywords: Differential game; pursuit–evasion; hybrid dynamics; 49N70; 34A38; 91A23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198912500144

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