SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TON-PERSON SOCIAL DILEMMA GAMES: CLASSIFICATION AND ANALYSIS

Ugo Merlone, Daren R. Sandbank () and Ferenc Szidarovszky ()
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Daren R. Sandbank: Systems and Industrial Engineering Department, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona 85721-0020, USA
Ferenc Szidarovszky: Department of Applied Mathematics, University of Pécs, Pécs, Hungary, H-7624, Hungary

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2012, vol. 14, issue 03, 1-25

Abstract: This paper presents a new systematic review ofN-person social dilemma games using a new approach based on dynamic properties of the corresponding system. TraditionallyN-person social dilemma games are classified by relative orders of magnitude of payoff parameters. Without border-line cases 24 are identified. The new approach introduced in this paper categorizes the social dilemma games in cases with different number and asymptotic properties of the equilibria. In these cases the solution structure or the trajectory of the percentage of cooperators is readily apparent. These cases also provide the modeler with additional information concerning the impacts of the model parameters on the game outcomes. The example of a simple cartel illustrates this methodology.

Keywords: Social dilemmas; agent-based simulation; N-person games; Pavlovian agents; equilibrium; 91A06; 91A26; 91E10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198912500156

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