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Emilio Calvo () and Esther Gutiérrez ()
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Esther Gutiérrez: Departamento de Economía Aplicada IV., Universidad del País Vasco U. P. V./E. H. U, Av. Lehendakari aguirre, 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2013, vol. 15, issue 01, 1-24

Abstract: A value for games with a coalition structure is introduced, where the rules guiding cooperation among the members of the same coalition are different from the interaction rules among coalitions. In particular, players inside a coalition exhibit a greater degree of solidarity than they are willing to use with players outside their coalition. The Shapley value is therefore used to compute the aggregate payoffs for the coalitions, and the solidarity value to obtain the payoffs for the players inside each coalition.

Keywords: Coalitional value; Shapley value; Owen value; Solidarity value; C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198913500023

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