SOME NONSTANDARD FEATURES OF BARGAINING PROBLEMS

Alessandro Agnetis () and Vito Fragnelli ()
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Alessandro Agnetis: Dipartimento di Ingegneria dell'Informazione, Università di Siena, Via Roma, 56, Siena, 53100, Italy

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2013, vol. 15, issue 02, 1-10

Abstract: In this paper, we present two real-world situations in which the standard hypotheses of a bargaining problem do not hold, and discuss how to tackle these situations.

Keywords: Bargaining problem; convexity; discrete set; 91A12; 91A80; 91B26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198913400070

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