COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: SOME OPEN PROBLEMS

Francoise Forges and Roberto Serrano

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2013, vol. 15, issue 02, 1-17

Abstract: This is a brief survey describing some of the recent progress and open problems in the area of cooperative games with incomplete information. We discuss exchange economies, cooperative Bayesian games with orthogonal coalitions, and issues of cooperation in noncooperative Bayesian games.

Keywords: Strategic externalities; informational externalities; exchange economies; cooperative games with orthogonal coalitions; noncooperative Bayesian games; C71; C72; D51; D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information: Some Open Problems (2013)
Working Paper: Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information: Some Open Problems (2011)
Working Paper: Cooperative games with incomplete information: Some open problems (2011)
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198913400094

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