SOCIAL CHOICE AND COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY: VOTING GAMES AS SOCIAL AGGREGATION FUNCTIONS

Mathieu Martin () and Maurice Salles
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Mathieu Martin: THEMA, University of Cergy-Pontoise, 95000 Cergy-Pontoise, France

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2013, vol. 15, issue 03, 1-17

Abstract: We consider voting games as procedures to aggregate individual preferences. We survey positive results on the nonemptiness of the core of voting games and explore other solutions concepts that are basic supersets of the core such as Rubinstein's stability set and two types of uncovered sets. We consider cases where the sets of alternatives are 'ordinary' sets, finite sets and infinite sets with possibly a topological structure.

Keywords: Social choice; aggregation functions; voting games; C7; D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Social choice and cooperative game therory: voting games as social aggregation functions (2013)
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198913400124

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