POWER SHARING IN POLITICS

Manfred J. Holler () and Hannu Nurmi ()
Additional contact information
Manfred J. Holler: Department of SocioEconomics, University of Hamburg, Von-Melle-Park 5, D-20146 Hamburg, Germany
Hannu Nurmi: Department of Political Science, University of Turku, Arwidssonink. 2, FI-20014 Turku, Finland

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2013, vol. 15, issue 03, 1-13

Abstract: After a brief description of a representative selection of power indices and a discussion of the notion of power in collective decision making, the paper discusses the modeling of power of an individual or collective agent as identified with the potential or factual effect the decision of this agent has on the outcome. It demonstrates that the distribution of power is crucially dependent on the procedures resorted to, and not just on the distribution of resources and the majority threshold as captured by the standard power measures. Similarly, it is shown that the selection and formulation of the questions to analyze can be highly relevant when we link power and power measures to causality. The concluding section discusses whether power indices are measures that represent power and ratios of power, or whether they are indicators that point out properties of the cooperative game and the underlying decision situation.

Keywords: Causality; power indices; preference proximity; D63; D71; H42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219198913400136
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:15:y:2013:i:03:n:s0219198913400136

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

DOI: 10.1142/S0219198913400136

Access Statistics for this article

International Game Theory Review (IGTR) is currently edited by David W K Yeung

More articles in International Game Theory Review (IGTR) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().