EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

ASPECTS OF EXCHANGEABILITY IN THE SHAPLEY VALUE

R Amit and Parthasarathy Ramachandran ()
Additional contact information
Parthasarathy Ramachandran: Department of Management Studies, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, India

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2013, vol. 15, issue 04, 1-11

Abstract: One of the important solution concepts in cooperative game theory is the Shapley value. The Shapley value is a probabilistic value in which each player subjectively assigns probabilities to the events which define their positions in a game. One of the most important concepts of subjective probability is the exchangeability. This paper characterizes the aspects of exchangeability in the Shapley value. We discuss exchangeability aspects in the Owen's multilinear characterization of the Shapley value; and, derive the Shapley value using exchangeability. We also link exchangeability to the Shapley's original derivation of the Shapley value. Lastly, we discuss exchangeability aspects in the semivalues. We show that, for a fixed finite set of players, the probability assignment in a semivalue cannot be a unique mixture of binomial distributions.

Keywords: Shapley value; exchangeability; de Finetti's theorem; JEL Classification: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219198913400288
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:15:y:2013:i:04:n:s0219198913400288

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

DOI: 10.1142/S0219198913400288

Access Statistics for this article

International Game Theory Review (IGTR) is currently edited by David W K Yeung

More articles in International Game Theory Review (IGTR) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().

 
Page updated 2021-06-19
Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:15:y:2013:i:04:n:s0219198913400288