CONTROL STRATEGIES FOR PLAYERS IN PURSUIT-EVASION GAMES BASED ON THEIR PREFERENCES

Dušan M. Stipanović (), Christopher Valicka () and Ali E. Abbas ()
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Dušan M. Stipanović: Coordinated Science Laboratory and the Department of Industrial and Enterprise Systems Engineering, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL 61801, USA
Christopher Valicka: Coordinated Science Laboratory and the Department of Industrial and Enterprise Systems Engineering, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL 61801, USA
Ali E. Abbas: Information Systems and Decision Analysis Laboratory and the Department of Industrial and Enterprise Systems Engineering, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL 61801, USA

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2014, vol. 16, issue 02, 1-20

Abstract: In this paper, a design of strategies for players in pursuit-evasion games, is provided. The design incorporates players' preferences captured in their goal functions which are constructed using particular functional forms that include multiattribute copulas. The approach provides closed-form strategies for the players governed by nonlinear models affine in control. A number of sufficient conditions based on differential inequalities for either evasion or capture is formulated. Finally, to demonstrate effectiveness of the proposed design, some illustrative simulations with players modeled as nonlinear and nonholonomic unicycles, are provided.

Keywords: Pursuit-evasion games; inequalities; multiattribute copulas; control strategies; 34A40; 49N75; 58E25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198914400088

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