THE DYNAMICS OF NORMS AND CONVENTIONS UNDER LOCAL INTERACTIONS AND IMITATION

Sebastian Ille

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2014, vol. 16, issue 03, 1-23

Abstract: Restricting the analysis to general 2×2 coordination games, this article shows how under certain conditions, it is highly likely that individuals coordinate on a (pay-off) efficient through risk inferior convention. This contrasts with other equilibrium refinement criteria, such as risk dominance or stochastic stability. Here it is assumed that players are situated on a toroidal regular lattice, interact only locally and, in each period, imitate the last period's most successful player in their neighborhood. If the set of observable players by an individual and the set that he interacts with are both identical and small, pay-off dominance plays the major role in defining the long-term convention. As the latter set of players increases, a risk dominant but pay-off inferior convention becomes more likely. The model also shows that the interaction of two player types in a nonsymmetric game potentially leads to nonegalitarian conventions.

Keywords: Existence and stability of equilibria; evolutionary games; behavior; simulation modeling; C62; C63; D73; D03; D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219198914500017
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:16:y:2014:i:03:n:s0219198914500017

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

DOI: 10.1142/S0219198914500017

Access Statistics for this article

International Game Theory Review (IGTR) is currently edited by David W K Yeung

More articles in International Game Theory Review (IGTR) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().