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STABLE COALITION STRUCTURES UNDER RESTRICTED COALITIONAL CHANGES

Yukihiko Funaki () and Takehiko Yamato ()
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Takehiko Yamato: Department of Social Engineering, Graduate School of Decision Science and Technology, Tokyo Institute of Technology, 2-12-1-W9-81 Oookayama, Meguro-ku, Tokyo 152-8552, Japan

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2014, vol. 16, issue 03, 1-32

Abstract: In this paper, we examine whether farsighted players form the efficient grand coalition structure in coalition formation games. We propose a stability concept for a coalition structure, calledsequentially stability, when only bilateral mergers of two separate coalitions are feasible because of high negotiation costs. We provide an algorithm to check the sequential stability of the grand coalition structure as well as sufficient conditions for which the efficient grand coalition structure is sequentially stable. We also illustrate out results by means of common pool resource games and Cournot oligopoly games.

Keywords: Coalition formation; stability; farsighted players; Cournot oligopoly; common pool resource; C70; C71; D62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198914500066

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