BERGE–VAISMAN AND NASH EQUILIBRIA: TRANSFORMATION OF GAMES

Antonin Pottier and Rabia Nessah ()

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2014, vol. 16, issue 04, 1-8

Abstract: In this paper, we reconsider the concept of Berge equilibrium. In a recent work, Colmanet al.[(2011)J. Math. Psych.55, 166–175] proposed a correspondence for two-player games between Berge and Nash equilibria by permutation of the utility functions. We define here more general transformations of games that lead to a correspondence with Berge and Nash equilibria and characterize all such transformations.

Keywords: Berge equilibrium; Nash equilibrium; C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198914500091

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