BERGE–ZHUKOVSKII EQUILIBRIA: EXISTENCE AND CHARACTERIZATION

Rabia Nessah () and Moussa Larbani ()
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Moussa Larbani: Department of Business Administration, IIUM University, Jalan Gombak 53100, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2014, vol. 16, issue 04, 1-11

Abstract: In this paper, we investigate the existence of Berge–Zhukovskii equilibrium in general normal form games. We characterize its existence via the existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium of somen-person subgame derived of the initial game. The significance of the obtained results is illustrated by two applications. One in economy with environmental externalities and the other in oligopoly markets.

Keywords: Berge–Zhukovskii equilibrium; Nash equilibrium; mutual support; fixed point; oligopoly markets; C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198914500121

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