GLOBAL STABILITY OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN AGGREGATIVE GAMES

Koji Okuguchi () and Takeshi Yamazaki ()
Additional contact information
Koji Okuguchi: Tokyo Metropolitan University, 1-1 Minami-Ohsawa, Hachioji-shi 192-0397, Japan
Takeshi Yamazaki: Department of Economics, Niigata University, 8050 Ikarashi 2-no-cho, Nishi-ku, Niigata-shi 950-2181, Japan

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2014, vol. 16, issue 04, 1-15

Abstract: If an aggregative game satisfies the generalized Hahn conditions, then there exists a unique Nash equilibrium which may not be interior and is globally asymptotically stable under two alternative continuous adjustment processes with non-negativity constraints.

Keywords: Aggregative game; Cournot oligopoly; global stability; Nash equilibrium; C72; D43; L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219198914500145
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:16:y:2014:i:04:n:s0219198914500145

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

DOI: 10.1142/S0219198914500145

Access Statistics for this article

International Game Theory Review (IGTR) is currently edited by David W K Yeung

More articles in International Game Theory Review (IGTR) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().