Evolutionary Games and Local Dynamics

Philippe Uyttendaele () and Frank Thuijsman ()
Additional contact information
Philippe Uyttendaele: Department of Knowledge Engineering, Maastricht University, P. O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands
Frank Thuijsman: Department of Knowledge Engineering, Maastricht University, P. O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2015, vol. 17, issue 02, 1-11

Abstract: In this paper, we examine several options for modeling local interactions within the framework of evolutionary game theory. Several examples show that there is a major difference between population dynamics using local dynamics versus global dynamics. Moreover, different modeling choices may lead to very diverse results.

Keywords: Evolutionary games; replicator dynamics; local interactions; 91A22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219198915400162
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:17:y:2015:i:02:n:s0219198915400162

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

DOI: 10.1142/S0219198915400162

Access Statistics for this article

International Game Theory Review (IGTR) is currently edited by David W K Yeung

More articles in International Game Theory Review (IGTR) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().