A Note on a Class of Solutions for Games with Externalities Generalizing the Shapley Value

Joss Sánchez-Pérez ()
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Joss Sánchez-Pérez: Facultad de Economía, UASLP, San Luis Potosí, México

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2015, vol. 17, issue 03, 1-12

Abstract: In this paper we study a family of extensions of the Shapley value for games in partition function form withnplayers. In particular, we provide a complete characterization for all linear, symmetric, efficient and null solutions in these environments. Finally, we relate our characterization result with other ways to extend the Shapley value in the literature.

Keywords: Games in partition function form; Shapley value; integer partition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198915500036

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