Component Acquisition Games

Imma Curiel ()
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Imma Curiel: School of Engineering, University of Curaçao, Jan Noorduynweg 111, P. O. Box 3059, Curaçao

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2015, vol. 17, issue 04, 1-14

Abstract: This paper focuses on situations in several companies each of which has a set of jobs that it has to complete. Each job has a specific starting and ending time and a specific starting and ending point. In order to complete its jobs a company needs to acquire components. There are several types of components. Each job requires exactly one component but not all components are suitable for all jobs. By cooperating, the companies can reduce the costs of acquisition. A component can be used by several companies as long as there is no overlap in the time-intervals of usage by different companies and there is enough time to move the component from where a company has stopped using it to where the next company needs it. A cooperative component acquisition game is constructed to model the cooperation between the companies. This game need not be balanced. Additional properties are introduced that guarantee the game to be totally balanced. We construct an element of the core by using the integer programming formulation of the characteristic function. These games have some relationship with coloring games but we show that results that are valid for coloring games do not hold for them.

Keywords: Perfect graph; chromatic number; cooperative combinatorial game; totally balanced game; 91A43; 90B05; 90C27 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198915500127

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