Strategic Support of Node-Consistent Cooperative Outcomes in Dynamic Games Played Over Event Trees

Elena Parilina () and Georges Zaccour

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2016, vol. 18, issue 02, 1-16

Abstract: In this paper, we show that cooperative outcomes in a dynamic game played over an event tree can be supported strategically, that is, to be part of a subgame perfect ε-equilibrium. A numerical example illustrates our results.

Keywords: Stochastic games; S-adapted strategies; cooperative solution; ε-equilibrium; strategic support (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C71 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198916400028

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